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In recent years, interest in
state and local taxation of
business has been fueled by
concerns over the possible
deleterious effects such taxes
may have on economic development and, in
particular, on the ability of a jurisdiction to
provide jobs for its residents.  Much ink has
been spilled over whether or not fiscal factors
have a significant effect on firm location deci-
sions.  However, without analyzing why busi-
ness taxes are on the books in the first place, it
may be impossible to properly evaluate the
impact of such taxes on business location.  In
this article, we advance the proposition that
general business taxation should be structured
so as to recover the costs of public services
rendered to the business community.
Economic development may be but one
objective of tax policy.  Other objectives,
such as fairness, economic efficiency, and
sound expenditure policy, are also important.
For example, a local community may want to
structure its taxes to discourage business ac-
tivities which produce noxious side effects;
state government may wish to restrict busi-
ness activity in such a way as to promote
monopoly power of home enterprise(s) serv-
ing an out-of-state clientele.  Even in the
absence of such motives for growth controls,
business taxation may be desirable to recover
the cost of government services provided to
businesses within a jurisdiction.  Not only
does this promote fairness, by recouping the
costs of such services from those who ulti-
mately benefit from them, it also enhances
economic efficiency by causing the prices of
goods and services to reflect their full costs of
production.  Such prices enable people to
make appropriate choices among consumer
goods.  Business benefits taxes similarly pro-
mote appropriate choices between private and
public goods.  Without recovery of the costs
of business services, voters may not support
otherwise worthy public services provided to
business.  Alternatively, the voting public and
their representatives may believe that business
taxes can be ratcheted skyward as a way to
subsidize those public services provided to
households.
One objective of this article is to develop a
comprehensive framework for evaluating the
efficacy of state-local business tax structures.
This framework will then be applied to existing
practices within the U.S., with specific focus
upon the Seventh Federal Reserve District,
which encompasses Iowa and major portions of
Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Wisconsin.
We will argue that the primary basis for gener-
al business taxation is to recover the costs of
government services rendered to the business
community.  It follows that if general busi-
ness taxes exceed or fall short of the cost ofFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 3
providing government services to business,
the business tax structure is not neutral with
respect to the location of business activity in
general.  Furthermore, it will not be neutral
with respect to consumption patterns for con-
sumer goods and the composition of spending
on private goods and public goods.
It should be emphasized that, even where
there is correspondence between business taxa-
tion and business expenditures, there may
remain non-neutral location incentives for
specific firms.  This will be the case if the
business tax structure is not neutral across firm
types or if there are wide disparities among
firm types in terms of service benefits received
from government.  In effect, what is true on
average may not be true for particular firms.
These issues should be considered when de-
signing the optimal business tax structure.
We begin by providing a framework under
which businesses might be taxed to optimal
effect.  Following definition and measurement
of current state-local business taxation, we
discuss alternative business tax structures.
Among these alternatives, the benefits princi-
ple is identified as the best by far.  Turning to
the specifics of how to implement the benefits
principle, today’s practices are held up against
the theoretical standard that business tax reve-
nues should roughly cover direct
public service costs.  In the final
section, we suggest how state-
local government might lower
taxation of business by levying
uniform tax rates on a broad-based





Business taxes are not easy to
define.  Many business taxes are
shifted from the legal or statutory
taxpayer to other entities.  Tax-
shifting mechanisms are frequent-
ly subtle and indirect; as a result,
theories of tax incidence are some-
times controversial.  Furthermore,
because only individuals, in their
capacities as consumers, workers,
entrepreneurs, or suppliers of land
and capital, can bear the burden of
taxes, the incidence of particular taxes con-
tributes little to a useful definition of business
taxes.
Our approach is to define business taxes to
include any levy upon a firm’s purchase of
inputs, its transfer or ownership of assets, its
earnings, or its right to do business—in short,
any levy which would, in the absence of price
adjustments, reduce the firm’s bottom line.
Included in this definition are corporate profits
taxes; real and personal property taxes on busi-
ness assets; franchise taxes and business license
fees; sales and use taxes and gross receipts taxes
upon a firm’s purchase of equipment, services,
and materials; and those payroll taxes for which
the firm is the statutory taxpayer.
By this definition, business taxes can be
seen to produce a prodigious flow of revenue
to state and local governments.  Table 1 shows
revenues for fiscal year 1992 by category of
tax and in total for the U.S.  Business taxes
accounted for 28.9 percent of all state-local tax
revenue, amounting to approximately $160
billion.  Among the categories, property taxes
were the most significant single item, account-
ing for 42.8 percent of business taxes.  Corpo-
rate income taxes, general sales taxes, and
payroll taxes (that is, unemployment insur-
ance) each accounted for a sizable share.
State & local business taxes in the United States, 1992
TABLE 1
Percent of Percent of total
Total business state-local taxes
Property $68,644 42.8 12.4
Sales $23,151 14.4 4.2
Unemployment
insurance $15,489 9.6 2.8
Corporate
income $21,937 13.7 3.9
Insurance $4,043 2.5 0.7
Utility $7,397 4.6 1.3
Motor fuel $9,165 5.7 1.6
Othera $10,687 6.7 1.9
Total business
taxes $160,514 100.0 28.9
Total taxes $555,479 -- --
aOther taxes include occupational and business license taxes
and selective sales taxes.
Source:  Staff calculations based on data reported by the U.S.
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Goverments
Division and individual state fiscal agencies.ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 4
Together, these four categories accounted for
more than 79 percent of all business taxes.
Excluded from our definition, for the most
part, are general and selective sales taxes on
items purchased by consumers; it is expected
that such taxes are shifted to the purchaser.1
However, if the buyer is a business enterprise,
the tax payment will have been captured by our
definition above.
We also exclude personal income tax lia-
bilities upon the profits of unincorporated
enterprises.  While one might expect that prof-
its taxes would be treated independently of the
legal form of organization, that is not the case.
Corporate income tax is an added layer of
business tax; dividends and capital gains of
firms that pay corporate income tax are also
subject to personal income tax.  Personal in-
come tax applies to the returns of all capital
investments made by an individual, including
those arising from business ownership.  Thus,
if the individual proprietor failed to engage in
business within the state, the assets would have
been invested in other pursuits and subject to
personal income tax.  The only persuasive case
for including such taxes as business taxes re-
lates to those proprietors with out-of-state
residences.  For such individuals, personal
income taxes paid to the host state are costs of
doing business, which must be compared with
costs existing elsewhere.  Fortunately, howev-
er, the vast majority of unincorporated enter-
prises are owned by residents.2
Rationale for general business taxes
The widespread use of business taxes
today does not in itself imply that their level
and structure are in accord with the principles
of good taxation.3  In this section, we discuss
the rationale for business taxation.  Our discus-
sion will be confined to those taxes which are
imposed upon business enterprises in general,
or on a large subset of business firms, such as
corporations.  Taxes upon specific activities,
such as mineral extraction or chemical produc-
tion, are not considered.  Presumably, the ob-
jective of such taxes is to correct for externali-
ties, such as environmental damage, or to cap-
ture benefits of natural resources for the citi-
zenry as a whole.  The rationale for such taxes
does not apply to the argument for general
business taxation.  There may be a good case
for specific business taxes to control for envi-
ronmental damage or to capture some of the
rents associated with a state’s unique resourc-
es, such as mineral wealth or favorable loca-
tion.  Such taxes should be considered as sup-
plements to the general business taxes that we
treat below.4
A number of possible motives for state-
local taxation have been suggested or can be
inferred from current practice.  These include
ability to pay, tax exporting, political expedi-
ency, and the benefits principle.  Each was
analyzed by Oakland (1992).  Only the bene-
fits principle was shown to survive scrutiny.
Most other motives were seen to be unattain-
able or based upon flawed economic reason-
ing.  Only the three most compelling types of
rationale will be treated here.  The first two
may account for the widespread use of busi-
ness taxation.  The third is prescriptive—how
business should be taxed.
Ease of raising revenue
Business taxation offers governments the
opportunity to collect large sums of revenue
from relatively few taxpayers.  In addition,
because the incidence of business taxes is often
uncertain, it may encounter relatively little
political opposition.  Many taxpayers may
perceive that such taxes are paid out of the
“deep pockets” of rich corporations and/or
absentee rich shareholders.  Others may not
hold that opinion, but would vigorously oppose
attempts to raise their personal taxes; in effect,
business taxation may appear to public offi-
cials to be the only course available.
While ease of collection is a valid criterion
for tax policy, particularly in less-developed
economies, advances in tax administration
have enabled governments in advanced econo-
mies to collect personal taxes at acceptable
compliance costs.5  Hence, collection costs
cannot serve as a principal criterion for the
choice of tax structure.  As far as reducing
citizen opposition to higher personal taxes is
concerned, this is more properly viewed as a
serious disadvantage of business taxes.  Good
tax policy should confront citizen-taxpayers
with the true costs of providing public services.
If citizens consistently underestimate these
costs, they will support too large a range and
level of public services.6  Viewed in this light,
general business taxation has the potential to
do serious economic damage and should, there-
fore, be discouraged.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 5
To export the tax burden
A common rationale for business taxation
is that it extends the reach of the taxing juris-
diction to residents of other jurisdictions.  We
offer as evidence the increasingly dispropor-
tionate weighting of sales in allocation formu-
las to determine the state share of the profits of
multistate or multinational corporations when
levying corporate income tax.7  We find further
evidence in the rapid spread of legalized gam-
bling activity, apparently prompted by the
desire to attract out-of-state gamblers.8
Whether it be through taxing the profits of
out-of-state shareholders, taxing out-of-state
consumers of goods produced locally, or taxing
the income of out-of-state landholders, busi-
ness taxation may be viewed as a means of
transferring some of the costs of local govern-
ment to residents of other jurisdictions.  While
this may be legitimate if the activity is limited
to recovering costs of government services
extended to such “foreigners,” there is no rea-
son to suppose that the practice would be so
limited.9  The prospect of a “free lunch” has
irresistible political appeal.
However, like most free lunches, the bene-
fit is more illusion than reality.  The opportuni-
ties for successful tax exporting are quite limit-
ed, and those that exist can be more successfully
exploited by finer instruments than general
business taxes.  For example, consider the dis-
proportionate use of sales factor by consuming
states.  The resultant higher taxes increase the
cost of selling in the taxing state; this prompts a
price increase so that the firm can receive the
same net revenue as from selling the item in
some other market.  In general, the ability to
export taxes is restricted to situations where the
state has some competitive advantage, owing to
superior or unique natural resources.  Here the
state can successfully capture the “rent” of these
resources through taxation.  However, the ap-
propriate tax is not one on all businesses but a
selective tax on the resource itself (for example,
a severance tax) or on a product that uses the
resource (for example, a tax on hotels).  Hence,
the case for general business taxation cannot be
based upon tax exportation.10
To recoup the costs of public services
Government provides the business com-
munity with a legal framework for conducting
its affairs, through its civil court system.  It
also offers direct services to businesses and
their employees, such as transportation and
public safety.  These services make it possible
for the firm to produce more efficiently, allow-
ing for lower prices and/or higher wages and
profits.  Business taxation allows those who
benefit from these services, whether within or
outside the jurisdiction, to contribute to their
costs.  It also has the salutary effect of lower-
ing the taxes to citizen-taxpayers, enabling
them to make a more accurate assessment of
the true costs of public services rendered di-
rectly to them and to the business community.11
In such circumstances, business taxation
promotes the benefits approach to taxation.
Without business taxation, this approach would
be difficult, if not impossible, to adopt.  For
example, if the beneficiaries of business servic-
es are out-of-state individuals or business enti-
ties, the home state simply has no means of
taxing them directly.  On the other hand, if the
beneficiaries are home-state residents, the state
would have to know how the services translat-
ed into lower goods prices or higher wages and
profits—an insurmountable task.  By taxing
business directly for services received, such
computations are unnecessary, and ultimate
beneficiaries would be taxed in proportion to
the costs incurred by the government sector.
The benefits principle has particular rele-
vance for state and local tax structures.  Its
rival criterion, the ability-to-pay principle, is
difficult to implement at these levels of gov-
ernment because of mobility limitations.  For
household service provision and taxation, the
well-to-do tend to flee from jurisdictions with
punitive tax burdens.  Mobility becomes a
more compelling issue for businesses and may
play an important role in economic develop-
ment.  In contrast, business taxes which con-
form to the benefits principle will be neutral
with respect to economic development.  They
place the jurisdiction at neither a competitive
advantage nor disadvantage per se.12
Can the benefits principle be implemented?
The merits of the benefits approach to
business taxation have been noted in the tax
literature.  However, many analysts have ques-
tioned whether it can be implemented (ACIR
1978).  These analysts argue that because most
government services are provided to businesses
free of charge, there is no objective measure of
use by different business entities; ergo, the
benefits principle cannot be implemented.ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 6
The major premise that business utilization
rates of government services cannot be finely
measured must go unchallenged.  However, it
does not follow that relative business utilization
rates cannot be approximated.  It surely is the
case that within a broad industry grouping, for
example, the finance, insurance, and real estate
industry or manufacturing, larger firms utilize
more services than smaller firms.  Even among
disparate industry groups, it is also likely that
government services arising from employment
are more heavily used by large employers than
small ones.  So business size is a likely impor-
tant correlate of business service costs.
Using size as the sole measure of relative
service benefits would undoubtedly be subject
to error.  However, the degree of error in rela-
tive treatment would be far less than that of a
policy which charged business nothing for
government services.  A tax based upon size
would eliminate the relative subsidy to large
firms.  Moreover, the failure to charge business
taxes would distort the price facing citizens for
their public consumption goods.  To get this
price right, business taxes in the aggregate
should equal the cost of providing business
services.  Therefore, we believe there is merit
in business benefits taxation on the average.
While there will remain errors and distortions
in the resulting pattern of business taxation,
these errors will be smaller than if no tax at all
were imposed.  In the absence of any other
sound basis for business taxation, it follows
that the imposition of size-related business
taxes is the appropriate policy prescription.
The case for business taxation
On the plus side, business taxes can be
used to promote the principle of benefits taxa-
tion, which places the burden of taxation on
those who enjoy the ultimate benefits of certain
public services, and at the same time neither
penalizes nor subsidizes economic develop-
ment.  On the negative side, because it may not
be perceived as a cost to the citizen-taxpayer,
business taxation may be pushed to excessive
levels, encouraging wasteful expansion of
publicly provided consumption services and
leading to a diminution of job opportunities
within a jurisdiction.  Given that political expe-
diency may prevail over economic efficiency,
one might expect general business taxation to
be carried to levels beyond that suggested by
the benefits approach.  In the empirical work to
follow, this hypothesis will be examined in the
Seventh District and in other regions.  In addi-
tion, we measure how state-local governments
might maintain the current level of business tax
collections by levying taxes as a uniform per-
centage of value added.
Business taxes and business
expenditures
Taxes
Businesses are taxed by both local and
state governments.  While authority for partic-
ular tax bases varies from state to state, gener-
ally speaking local governments rely primarily
on the property tax for funding, while state
governments generally collect sales taxes and
corporate income taxes, as well as the bulk of
tax revenues on insurance premiums, motor
fuel sales, and the gross receipts of public
utilities.  In the Seventh District states, corpo-
rate income taxes, unemployment compensa-
tion, and insurance premiums are major busi-
ness taxes which are exclusively collected for
state government operations; taxes on general
sales, public utility gross receipts, and motor
fuel are levied at the state level and, to a lesser
degree, at the local level.  The property tax has
been, in recent decades, almost exclusively a
local tax source.
Drawing from data collected by the Bu-
reau of the Census and from state fiscal author-
ities, business tax revenues at both the state
and local levels can be distinguished from tax
revenues from the household sector.  Corporate
income tax revenues and business license taxes
can be wholly allocated to the business sector.
In all other instances, the business and house-
hold sectors are taxed under the same statutes.
For example, state sales taxes are imposed on
the final retail purchases of households and on
certain intermediate purchases made by busi-
nesses.  Accordingly, revenues must be par-
celed between the household sector and the
business sector for major revenue sources,
which include the general sales tax, public
utility gross receipts, insurance premiums,
motor fuel, and property tax.
According to studies of business taxes for
states and regions of the United States, busi-
ness taxes declined from 42 percent of total
state-local tax collection in 1957 to 29 percent
in 1992 (ACIR 1967, 1981; Tannenwald 1993)
(figure 1).  The declining share of taxes attrib-
uted to business largely reflects the risingFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 7
Business’ share of taxes in the U.S.
FIGURE 1
FIGURE 2
Business taxes paid, by BEA region
because they are often targeted to a specific
industry, indicating to us that the intent of the
tax is other than to cover the government ex-
pense of providing business services.  Perhaps
these selective taxes are intended to compensate
for environmental damage or to expropriate the
income on assets of out-of-state owners.
Some taxes that we do include may appear
to be selective, such as insurance premiums,
public utility gross receipts, and motor fuel tax.
We include these because they are applied to a
wide spectrum of each state’s business sector
and can, therefore, be considered a tax on in-
termediate inputs to business production.  For
these revenue sources, some care must be taken
to apportion tax revenues accurately to the
business sector rather than to the government
and household sectors.  So too, following De-
Boer (1992) and Oakland (1992), data provid-
ed by state fiscal agencies can often be grouped
more finely than nationally reported data for
important hybrid taxes such as the property
tax.  Data collected nationally by federal agen-
cies must understandably compromise some
detail in exchange for a broad reporting of
data.14  (See appendix for methodology.)
In reviewing our business tax measure-
ments, property tax collections dominate
business tax collections in states of the Dis-
trict (figure 3).15  An estimated 47 percent of
1992 business tax collections were derived
from this revenue source.  Corporate income
(17.2 percent), unemployment compensation
dominance of personal income taxation by
states over the past 25 years, rather than any
marked slowing in the pace of business tax
collections.  The rise in personal income taxa-
tion corresponds to the growing share of public
services provided to households by state-local
government—especially health and education.
Variation in the dependence on business
taxes (as most commonly defined) in 1992
among regions, as defined by the U.S. Bureau
of Economic Analysis, lies within a fairly
narrow band.  When we update this methodolo-
gy, originally developed by the U.S. Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations (ACIR), for the 1992
fiscal year, we find that in the
Great Lakes region (that is, Illinois,
Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and Wis-
consin), business taxes comprise
29.0 percent of state-local taxes,
compared with 30.7 percent in the
U.S.  The Southwest leads with
41.3 percent, because of its heavy
use of state severance taxes on
energy minerals.  All other regions
lie within 3 percentage points of
the national average (figure 2).13
In measuring business taxes for
the states of the Seventh District, we
differ from much of the literature in
both definition and methodology.
We exclude from our business tax
definition selective excise taxes,







1957 ’67 ’77 ’80 ’87 ’92
percent
Source: ACIR (1981), appendix.
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FIGURE 3
Distribution of business taxes, 1992
(11.4 percent), and the state sales tax portion
collected on intermediate purchases by the
business sector (11.6 percent) also represent
major business taxes.
While we have chosen to define business
taxes by their broad-based application to the
business sector, there is at least one noteworthy
imbalance in the business tax structure which
suggests a lack of evenness and neutrality
across types of businesses.  Specifically, a
heavy share of state-local business taxes in the
Seventh District and in the nation is initially
imposed on business capital by way of proper-
ty tax and state corporate income tax.  Such a
system may skew any burden of taxation to-
ward goods-producing industries and away
from the service-producing industries which
tend to employ more labor than capital.  Heavy
state taxation of public utility inputs and sales
taxation of tangible inputs to production would
only tend to aggravate such an imbalance.
We and others have long noted other im-
balances in the structure of state-local business
tax systems (ACIR 1978; Stocker 1972).  The
taxation of profits (within corporate net income
tax) would seem to penalize exactly those
(profitable) firms that may have desirable pros-
pects for rapid growth and development.16
Another imbalance may involve the unemploy-
ment insurance system, which frequently taxes
new firms (having no employment history) at a
very high rate.  Many such firms tend to be
labor intensive, small, and innovative.
Expenditures
Expenditures by function for state-local
governments are reported annually by the Gov-
ernments Division of the Bureau of the Census,
U.S. Department of Commerce.  Total direct
expenditures by function include all payments
to employees, suppliers, contractors, beneficia-
ries, and all other final recipients of govern-
ment payments.  Intergovernmental expendi-
tures—payments and grants between state and
local governments—are excluded.  Such ex-
penditures become expenditures of those gov-
ernments where the funds come to rest.  Since
we are interested only in those expenditures
made by state-local government, federal grant
monies by function are netted out of these
same functional expenditures.  Similarly, reve-
nues derived from user charges and fees (such
as college tuition and roadway tolls) are netted
out of appropriate expenditures made by state-
local government.  The remainder represents
those direct expenditures by function that are
funded by state-local own-source tax revenues.
In allocating state-local spending to the
Seventh District’s business sector, we classify
expenditure programs into business, household,
prorated, and joint (shared).  “Business” pro-



































Source: Staff calculations based on data provided by state fiscal agencies and
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FIGURE 4
Distribution of state and local expenditures, 1992
business, for example, agricultural programs
and water transportation terminals.  These are
estimated at less than 1 percent of total state-
local direct expenditures in 1992 for the Seventh
District states as a whole (see figure 4).  In
contrast, “household” expenditures comprise
62.5 percent overall, and are assumed to benefit
households only, for example, education, wel-
fare, health, parks and recreation, and housing.
“Prorated” programs include “overhead”
functions, such as general public buildings,
legislative and financial administration.  These
expenditures are allocated to the business sec-
tor proportionately, based on the share of busi-
ness expenditures to the total of business plus
household expenditures.  For the Seventh Dis-
trict, we find that prorated business expendi-
tures account for 2.0 percent, in comparison to
the 12.8 percent share commanded by the
household sector.
Finally, “joint” or shared expenditures are
perhaps the most difficult to allocate between
the business and the household sectors, because
of the broad categories into which state-local
expenditure data are classified.  We choose to
liberally allocate shared expenditures to the
business sector.  Accordingly, these programs,
which include police and fire, corrections, and
transportation, are assumed to be shared equal-
ly between the business and household sectors,
so that each sector commands 10.9 percent of
state-local direct expenditure.  All told, public
spending that can be classified as an intermedi-
ate input to business production amounts to
13.8 percent of the total.
The large remaining share of state-local
spending attributable to the household sector
may seem disproportionate to some observers.
While state-local government does provide
essential business services, such as transporta-
tion infrastructure and protection of business
property, its role has increasingly come to
focus on welfare and education.  From 1950 to
1992, the share of state-local government’s
direct general expenditure on education and
social welfare (including health and hospitals)
climbed from 44.4 percent to 58.9 percent.
(Other services such as police, fire, transporta-
tion, and general administration are shared by
the household sector.)  While the business
sector arguably benefits indirectly from such
services, the direct benefits mainly accrue to
households.  To the extent that these services
raise labor productivity, businesses will pay for
higher productivity through wages paid to the
household sector.  More to the point, our inten-
tion here is to measure those expenditures and
taxes directly accruing to business and directly
paid by business.  To the extent that general
business expenditures are in alignment with
Source: Staff calculations based on data provided by state fiscal agencies and
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FIGURE 5
State and local business taxes versus public
expenditures, Seventh District, 1992
Rather, the finding that general
business tax collections tend to
exceed expenditures suggests the
need for further study, using
individual state and local fiscal
reporting systems that more
finely distinguish business from
household service expenditures.
Based on the 1992 data,
states in every Census region
appear to have taxed business in
excess of direct business service
expenditures (table 2).  For
fiscal 1992, state-local general
business taxes in the U.S. ex-
ceeded expenditures by 70 per-
cent, on average.  Nonetheless,
across the nine Census regions,
the aggregate ratio of taxes to
expenditures lies with a fairly
tight band, ranging from 1.45 in
the South Atlantic region to a
high of 2.08 for the West South Central states.
The Seventh District average of 1.87 is close
to the national average.
Tax structure:  Which business taxes
to employ?
It is important to think about the combined
effects of all general business taxes employed.
It may well be that any particular tax is too
narrow in application but that, in combination
with some other tax, it provides a suitably
general taxes paid by business, it can be argued
that the price signals between the voting public
and its government sector are not distorted, so
that the correct degree of both business servic-
es and household services will be chosen by
public decisionmakers.
Even with somewhat generous assump-
tions about the direct benefits of shared expen-
diture programs, figure 5 suggests that in the
Seventh District states overall and in each state
individually business taxes exceed business
expenditures by healthy propor-
tions.  In fiscal year 1992, business
taxes in the District states overall
exceeded expenditures almost two-
fold.  This indicates that, taking the
benefits principle approach, discus-
sions of tax reform should be di-
rected toward bringing business
taxation and business expenditures
into closer alignment.
Given the approximate nature
of our calculations, especially in
classifying expenditures on public
services to businesses versus
households, individual states have
no reason to be alarmed about
competitive harm vis à vis neigh-
boring district states due to excess
taxation.  Expenditure classifica-
tions as reported by the Census
Bureau are necessarily broad.
State and local business taxes and expenditures, 1992
TABLE 2
Business Ratio of taxes
Region expenditures Taxes to expenditures
(---millions of dollars---)
U.S. $94,136 $160,514 1.71
New England 5,076 $9,022 1.78
Mid-Atlantic 16,762 29,899 1.78
East North Central 15,077 27,781 1.84
West North Central 6,228 $9,843 1.58
South Atlantic 15,735 22,837 1.45
East South Central 4,290 6,768 1.58
West South Central 8,589 17,909 2.08
Mountain 5,471 8,169 1.49
Pacific 16,906 28,285 1.67
Seventh District 12,760 23,816 1.87
Source:  Staff calculations based on data reported by the
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
Governments Division and individual state fiscal agencies.











Source: Staff calculations based on data
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broad basis of business taxation.  It is also
clear from the above discussion, that any ac-
ceptable system must meet the test of compre-
hensiveness.  The business tax system should
reach all segments of the business community.
This would rule out taxes such as the state
corporation income tax, because there is no
countervailing tax that would apply exclusively
or mainly to unincorporated private sector
enterprises or to nonprofit business enterprises,
which do not earn taxable income.
Given that business benefits taxes should be
size-related, what measures of size can be used?
Here are two possibilities: (1) amounts of spe-
cific inputs; (2) amounts of output.  It is possible
to assess tax liabilities in accordance with labor
inputs, capital inputs, or material inputs.  The
latter is unacceptable, given the widespread use
of materials produced outside the jurisdiction.
While labor or capital taxes would apply to all
business entities, to focus on one or the other
would induce the firm to move away from the
taxed input to the non-taxed.  It also would tend
to favor or punish firms with differing degrees
of capital intensity.  In general, there is no rea-
son to believe that capital-intensive firms con-
sume more public services than labor-intensive
firms.  For some services, say fire protection,
capital may be a preferred indicator.  While for
others, such as police protection, employment
measures may be preferable.
Since neither measure is a superior benefit
indicator, avoidance of substitution distortions
and inequities is enhanced by a system which
utilizes both measures.  This raises the question
of weights.  One attractive weighting scheme
would utilize input earnings; this is tantamount
to an origin-based value-added tax.  The out-
come could be approximated by a combination
of property taxes and payroll taxes.  The quali-
ty of the approximation would, of course, de-
pend upon the relative use of the two taxes.
The use of outputs as measures of business
services leads to similar conclusions.  Basical-
ly, there are two possible measures: gross re-
ceipts and value added.  Gross receipts are an
unacceptable measure for the same reason that
materials are an unacceptable indicator of
input—they include a major component of
materials produced outside the district.  Gross
receipts taxation would also tend to be pyra-
mided to the extent that materials flow from
one producer to another within a jurisdiction.
Hence, we are left with value added as our
output indicator of firm size.  Since value add-
ed also serves as an adequate measure of input
use, it would seem to be the best candidate for
allocating the cost of business services.
The administrative costs of levying busi-
ness taxes according to value added by origin
are not formidable for most industries.  Michi-
gan has been imposing a form of value-added
tax since 1975.17  Value added can be derived
for each firm by summing its payments for
factors of production, including payroll, inter-
est paid, capital consumption, rents, and prof-
its.  Alternatively, value added can be derived
by subtracting firm purchases of intermediate
components and services from gross receipts.
Either way, the tax base would reflect the de-
gree of productive activities within the state, it
would be largely neutral with respect to capi-
tal/labor proportions, and it would be neutral
with respect to industry and legal form of busi-
ness organization.
The viability of subnational value-added
taxation is best illustrated by the relative ease
with which a rough approximation of the state
tax rates needed to raise revenue can be pre-
sented.18  The Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA) publishes annual estimates (by industry)
of value added.19  Taking our estimates of
FY1992 business tax collections as a numera-
tor, and BEA value added for the nongovern-
ment sector as a denominator, we produce the
uniform ad valorem tax rates necessary to raise
equivalent business tax revenues in District
states (table 3).  These figures show that a
business tax rate running between 1.5 percent
and 2.5 percent of value added would generate
the revenue equivalent of all state-local busi-
ness taxes, based on data for 1992.
These rates are low compared with the
statutory rates now on the books for taxing
corporate income, gross receipts, sales on inter-
mediate inputs, and the like.  These low rates
reflect the much broader basis of taxation im-
plied by using value added as a tax base.  Us-
ing value added would go a long away toward
avoiding the skewness of the present system of
state-local business taxation which tends to
assess many service firms lightly (even though
the service sector has become a much larger
share of nominal output).
We would expect these low rates to miti-
gate state-local concerns over competitive
fiscal disadvantages arising for certain capital-
intensive industrial sectors.  Remaining rateECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 12




Region business taxes business taxes
U.S. 3.1% 1.8%
New England 2.9 1.6
Mid-Atlantic 3.4 1.9
East North Central 3.2 1.7
West North Central 2.8 1.8
South Atlantic 2.7 1.9
East South Central 2.5 1.6
West South Central 3.3 1.6
Mountain 3.1 2.1
Pacific 3.1 1.9






Note: Gross state product (GSP) is net of government GSP.
Source:  Staff calculations based on data provided by the
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
Governments Division and state fiscal agencies.
Also, they focus almost exclu-
sively on taxes on business capital
and profits taxes, overlooking
important differentials in taxes
paid by business firms on their
intermediate purchases and on
their payroll.
By incorporating all taxes
directly affecting business and
taking into account the costs of
government services offered to
the business community, our
approach offers a more compre-
hensive measure of the business
tax climate.  It also enables us to
detect important disparities in the
business tax base.  While it is true
that other properties of a state’s
fiscal system, such as personal
taxes and expenditure on educa-
tion, may influence business
profitability, without a complex
general equilibrium model, such
effects are difficult to quantify.
The absence of such a complete
model also rules out the accurate
assessment of the marginal fiscal
climate.  Given these limitations, the best we
can do is compare the average fiscal climate of
competing states.
Because of their relative simplicity and
transparency, our measures offer a useful alter-
native to complex cost-of-capital models for
tax analysts in state capitols, whose job it is to
enlighten legislators on the possible conse-
quences of alternative business tax policies.
With regard to competitive tax climates in
particular, firms may prefer regions that offer a
level and mix of business services for which
the business community pays a proportionate
price and where household expenditures are
not subsidized by general business taxes.  Tax-
ing business in line with business services can
also help the voting public choose the best
levels and mix of publicly provided goods and
services.  Voters and their elected representa-
tives will be able to perceive the accurate price
signals for these goods.  A dynamic dialogue
between the business community and govern-
ment services providers can develop which
can, in turn, stimulate income creation or quali-
ty of life improvements in those regions that
choose to follow the benefits principle.
differences would become smaller as the tax
burden is spread over more industries.  The tax
rates would need to be cut in half if the state-
local sector were to bring business expendi-
tures into line with public expenditures directly
benefiting the business sector.  More impor-
tantly, remaining tax rate differences would
come to reflect differing public service needs
among states as reflected by industry mix.
Remaining tax rate differences might also
reflect different regional approaches to devel-
opment policy as some states and local com-
munities, perhaps acting in partnership with
their business communities, choose to offer
differing levels, mix, and delivery of public
inputs to private production.
Conclusion
It should be acknowledged that our ap-
proach to business location neutrality departs
sharply from the rate-of-return approach in
recent studies of state business tax climates.20
These studies examine how the financial re-
turns on investment are influenced by state and
local tax structures.  As such, they inherently
deny the value of government services that
may accrue to businesses at different sites.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 13
APPENDIX
Methodology for business taxes
and expenditures
Taxes
Unemployment insurance tax—Taxes are im-
posed by both the federal and state governments
on the basis of payroll of those workers covered
by unemployment insurance.  We report state
collections only, as reported by the Governments
Division, Bureau of the Census, U.S Department
of Commerce.
General sales tax collected from business—
The hybrid nature of the sales tax as consumer-
business tax presents formidable obstacles in distin-
guishing the business sector’s share of revenues
from that of consumers.  State revenue departments
typically report data by type of store or vendor
from which the sale takes place, with no informa-
tion about the buyer.  The existence and variety of
exemptions and partial exemptions for business
purchases further complicates the matter, as does
the varying exemption and coverage of certain
consumer items, such as food, clothing, and pre-
scription drugs.1
One estimation method has been to survey
vendors within a state as to their thoughts on who
purchases their taxable sales (Fryman 1969; ACIR
1981).  Another method applies sales tax rates to
government-reported data of consumer expendi-
tures; the residual represents an estimate of busi-
ness and tourist payments of the sales tax (Ring
1989; Blume 1983).  Other studies use interindustry
relationships, perhaps as reported in input-output
models, to estimate the volume of business pur-
chases subject to states sales taxation (DeBoer
1992; KPMG Policy Economics Group 1993),
while other estimates are derived from reported
collections by type of vendor (DeBoer 1992; Oak-
land 1992).
Our estimates take a decidedly conservative
approach, based on the Fryman and ACIR esti-
mates.  We adjust and update those earlier esti-
mates by examining changes in tax-base coverage
that have occurred over time.  For these changes,
the business share of the sales tax intake is adjusted
by regression elasticities, which capture the sensi-
tivity of sales tax revenues to specific tax exemp-
tions, such as that on industrial machinery and
equipment in Illinois during the 1980s.
Estimates of the business sector’s share of state
sales tax revenue collections are applied to Census
Bureau figures of general sales tax collections at the
state-local level for fiscal 1991–92 to arrive at esti-
mates of sales tax paid by businesses.  By our esti-
mates, the sales tax comprised 14.4 percent of state-
local business taxes in the U.S. in fiscal year 1992.
The corresponding share in the Seventh District lies
close to this estimate at 11.6 percent, with Indiana’s
20.2 percent share being the highest among District
states.  Michigan’s relatively low 7.8 percent share for
1992 has increased since that year; Michigan raised its
state sales tax from 4 percent to 6 percent in 1994.
Corporate income tax—These collection figures
are reported by the Census Bureau for fiscal 1991–
92 and, within the Seventh District, all collections
derive from state taxes.  Michigan imposes its single
business tax on the business activity or value added
of businesses operating within the state, rather than
on corporate net income.  Indiana is one of only
three states in the nation that taxes gross receipts of
corporations rather than net income.  The Indiana tax
is levied on the greater of tax due from gross receipts
or an alternative tax on corporate net income.  In
some 22 states, taxes are also levied on capital stock
or net worth, and then sometimes under a corporate
franchise tax.  Illinois imposes corporate levies on
capital stock or net worth, which may be termed
corporate franchise taxes.
Property tax—Beginning with a 1963 study, the
U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations began estimating property taxes paid by
commercial, industrial, and agricultural enterprises.
These estimates are based on tables of assessment
and collection values reported at five-year intervals
by the Census of Governments. We depart from that
practice and instead use property tax collections as
reported by individual state fiscal agencies for
business classes of property in the Seventh District.
For Michigan only, such collections by class must
be estimated.
Taxation of real property is predominantly im-
posed by local governments rather than by state
governments.  Because tax rates are usually applied
in an even fashion to classes of property, and be-
cause business property comprises a substantial
portion of real estate, a sizable share of the local
property tax falls on business property.2  The gross
assessed value of commercial, industrial, and acre-
age combine to account for one-third of all value
(commercial and industrial combined account for
one-fourth).3
The practice of taxing personal property (non-
realty tangible property) of business firms can also
be a great concern for those firms making heavy use
of industrial machinery and equipment, and firms
that own significant stocks of tangible inventory.
Over time, most states have moved toward exempt-
ing tangible personal property of both firms and
households, as Illinois did across the board in 1979.4
Most district states liberally exempt business person-
al property or are moving in that direction.
Business licenses and fees—We follow the ACIR
practice of including fees and taxes imposed on the
right to do business, at the state or local level.
These data are collected and grouped by the Gov-
ernments Division of the Bureau of the Census.ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 14
Taxes on broad-based inputs to production—We
exclude selective taxes such as those levied on
tobacco, alcohol, and amusement.  Presumably,
these are intended to be shifted forward to consum-
ers, or their taxation is intended to discourage the
activity rather than to act as a broad-based payment
for government services rendered.  Likewise, taxes
on specific industries, such as motel/hotel or sever-
ance taxes, are not broad-based business taxes but
are intended to discourage or compensate for dam-
ages imposed on the state or local community.  In
contrast, we do include the following selective sales
taxation of items which are broadly purchased as
intermediate inputs by the business community:
Insurance—Most states tax the premiums on
insurance sold in the state.  Since businesses
broadly purchase insurance, we estimate the
business sector’s share of such purchases in
allocating total insurance premium tax collec-
tions.  The sector’s share is calculated for re-
ported premiums sold by in-state companies to
other businesses in each of the respective states.
Such estimates are provided courtesy of the
Regional Economics Applications Laboratory,
which is a joint venture between the Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago and the University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.  We average the
latter estimates with groupings of insurance
premiums sold by type for each state, making
reasonable assumptions concerning likely types
of insurance purchased by the business sector
versus the household sector.  In contrast, ACIR
estimates typically include total insurance pre-
miums, including those sold to households.
Motor fuels taxes—Following DeBoer (1992),
we estimate motor fuel purchases by the business
sector as opposed to households in allocating
revenues collected.  These data are collected and
grouped by the Governments Division of the
Bureau of the Census.
Public utility gross receipts taxes—The busi-
ness portion of revenues is allocated using data
on investor-owned public utilities.  The Statistical
Yearbook of the Electric Utility Industry reports
gross receipts derived by sector, household ver-
sus commercial and industrial sector.  These data
are collected and grouped by the Governments
Division of the Bureau of the Census.
Expenditures
Expenditures by function are reported annually
by the Governments Division of the Bureau of the
Census, U.S. Department of Commerce.  Total
direct expenditures by function include all pay-
ments to employees, suppliers, contractors, benefi-
ciaries, and all other final recipients of government
payments.  Intergovernmental expenditures—
payments and grants to other governments between
state and local—are excluded.  Such expenditures
become expenditures of those governments where
the funds come to rest.  Since we are interested
only in those expenditures made by state-local
government, federal grant monies by function are
netted out of these same functional expenditures.
Similarly, revenues derived from user charges and
fees (such as college tuition and roadway tolls) are
netted out of appropriate expenditures made by
state-local government.  The remainder represents
those direct expenditures by function that are fund-
ed by state-local own-source tax revenues.
Two categories of expenditures must be allocat-
ed.  “Shared” expenditures are those for which little
information on benefits to business versus house-
holds are available, for example, police, fire, tran-
sit, sewerage, sanitation, and parking.  For these, a
liberal 50 percent is allocated to the business sector.
Those expenditures representing general gov-
ernment overhead, such as all financial administra-
tion services, all general public buildings, all other
miscellaneous government, interest on general debt,
all legislative, and other-unallocable, are assigned
to the business sector on a prorated basis.  The
proration reflects the share of business expendi-
tures, plus shared business expenditures to total
direct expenditures (net of prorated expenditures).
Other categories of spending are allocated di-
rectly to the business or to the household sector.
1For state-by-state coverage of consumer items in the sales
tax base, see ACIR (1994).
2The practices under which tax rates and/or property
assessment ratios vary by type of property is called classi-
fication.  Only a handful of states authorize classification.
Among the five district states, classification is authorized
only for Cook County, Illinois.  There, commercial and
industrial property is assessed at a rate more than double
that for single-family residential properties.
Of course, there are many selective tax abatements that
can be applied (usually on commercial properties) at the
discretion of local governments (which may be acting on
economic development concerns).  So too, state property
tax systems often contain “circuit breakers” and “exemp-
tions,” which exclude assessed value or offer tax reduc-
tions to classes of residential taxpayers, such as the elder-
ly, the poor, or veterans.  See ACIR, ibid.
3See table 4, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of
the Census (1987).
4U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census
(1988) reports in table 2 (p. 4) that personal property
comprises 10.3 percent of locally assessed property (not
all of which is business property).  State-assessed property
also includes personal property in some states, especially
that belonging to public utilities.  However, in total, state-
assessed property (real and personal) comprised only 5
percent of overall state-local gross assessed value in 1987.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 15
APPENDIX TABLE A
Seventh District share of state-local expenditures allocated
 to businesses and households, FY1992
(millions of dollars)
Spending Prorated Shared Prorated Shared






Veteran services 17 17
Natural resources
(fish + forestry) 155 155












administration 1,775 285 2,060
General public
buildings 645 103 749
General interest
on debt 4,988 799 5,787
Other government
administration (L+CS) 1,313 210 1,523
All other and
unallocable 3,072 492 3,564
Air transportation 26 26 52
Transportation
subsidies 9 9 19
Highways 3,619 3,619 7,238
Parking 56 56 113
Fire protection 891 891 1,782
Police 2,185 2,185 4,370
Corrections 1,553 1,553 3,106
Judicial 859 859 1,717
Protective inspection
and regulation 276 276 553
Sewage 626 626 1,252
Solid waste
management 542 542 1,084
Miscellaneous
federal grants (555) (555) (1,111)
Total 57,729 11,794 10,087 782 1,890 10,088 92,370
Share of total 62.5% 12.8% 10.9% 0.8% 2.0% 10.9% 100.0%
                                      Total household share 86.2%                                Total business share   13.8%
Note:  Columns may not add up due to rounding.
Source:  Staff calculations based on data from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Governments Division.ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 16
APPENDIX TABLE B
Business taxes: A comparison of measurements, FY1992
ACIR Corporate Motor
method Total Property Sales income Insurance Utility Unemployment fuel
(----------------------------------------------------------millions of dollars--------------------------------------------------------)
Illinois 7,945 3,285 1,135 970 198 1,171 922 0
Indiana 3,200 1,461 642 755 123 0 180 0
Iowa 1,382 6374 204 193 97 6 150 0
Michigan 6,934 3,111 550 1,730 178 44 1,113 0
Wisconsin 2,478 939 241 438 69 254 359 0
Seventh
District 21,939 9,433 2,772 4,086 665 1,475 2,724 0
Oakland/ Corporate Motor
Testa Total Property Sales income Insurance Utility Unemployment fuel
(----------------------------------------------------------millions of dollars--------------------------------------------------------)
Illinois 9,670 5,284 1,135 970 83 649 922 480
Indiana 3,191 1,305 642 755 64 0 180 217
Iowa 1,819 1,003 204 193 50 3 150 133
Michigan 5,994 2,063 550 1,730 92 23 1,113 298
Wisconsin 3,142 1,532 241 438 36 131 359 228
Seventh
District 23,816 11,187 2,772 4,086 324 806 2,724 1,355
Note: Figures may not add up due to tax categories omitted from this table.
Source:  Staff calculations based on data from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Governments Division.
NOTES
1If the tax cannot be shifted forward, then this procedure
is flawed.  For example, if a state levies a sales tax on
petroleum products refined in a particular state, and the
price of refined products are determined in world markets,
the tax would have to be added to the firm’s cost of doing
business within that state.  Fortunately, such situations are
not commonly the case.
2For small states, however, this point is more telling.
Business owners in the New York metropolitan statistical
area may have the option of relocating their businesses in
several states, making the issue of personal income taxes a
relevant factor in the location decision.  However, this is
mitigated by the common practice of crediting taxes paid
by host states.
3These issues are dealt with at greater length in Oakland
(1992).
4Indeed, the motor vehicle fuels tax could be treated under
either rubric.  It could be viewed as a user charge for the
wear and tear and highway congestion associated with
business transportation.  However, fuel consumed is not a
good measure of general environmental costs, such as
congestion and other nonpriced costs.  Accordingly, we
choose to treat motor fuels tax revenues as part of general
business taxation.
5In many instances the administrative cost advantages are
exaggerated because they include costs shifted from
government to the taxpayer.
6A substantial body of empirical studies provide evidence
that voters respond to the perceived cost (that is, “tax
price”) in making public expenditure decisions (see
Rubinfeld 1985).
7Typically a three-factor formula is employed for such
purposes: payroll, capital investment, and sales.  States
with few production facilities often put heavy, sometimes
exclusive, weight on the sales factor to capture a larger
share of the profits of multistate corporations.  Multistate
corporations in Iowa can use sales by destination as the
sole factor in apportioning taxable income.
8Now, the main objective may be to stem the outflow of
gambling money to other jurisdictions or, in effect, to
reduce tax importing.
9One might think that if all states adopt the practice, there
will be no such “other” market; hence the firm will have
to absorb the tax.  However, from the taxing state’s
vantage point, the policies of other states are irrelevant.
In the case under discussion, local residents would enjoy
lower prices than consumers elsewhere if the tax were not
imposed.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 17
10If the superior resource provided competitive advantages
to all production activities within the jurisdiction, a
general tax might be in order.  This might be true for
certain local governments—for example, cities with
outstanding harbors.  However, even here the ubiquitous-
ness of the advantage is questionable.
11While the business community can exert political influ-
ence, only individuals can vote.  Therefore, support for
desirable business services requires that voters not per-
ceive a fiscal loss.
12Of course, if other jurisdictions do not implement the
benefit principle, this neutrality would be vitiated.
13For details see Greco, Oakland, and Testa (forthcoming).
14Our finer measurements are carried out, not for each
region, but only for the states in the Seventh District.
15The state of Michigan has since reduced its reliance on
property taxes and hiked its reliance on general sales taxes
for funding elementary and secondary education in the
state.  However, we do not believe that overall reliance on
taxes imposed on the business sector has changed; proper-
ty tax reductions, if any, have probably been offset by
increased business tax payments made under the state’s
now-higher sales tax rate.  See Courant, Gramlich, and
Loeb (1995).  A reduction in property taxes in Wisconsin
is also imminent, but the sources of revenue compensation
have not yet been decided.
16States may be implicitly changing the nature of their
corporate taxes away from “profits or capital” taxes and
toward a type of sales or import tax.  Specifically, states
have been changing the formulas by which they allocate
the tax base of multistate companies.  By “double-weight-
ing” the allocation factor which counts the proportion of
the firm’s sales that are in-state, the corporate income tax
implicitly taxes the sales of out-of-state firms that are
being sold in the home state.  That is, the tax liability
correlates, not with firm profits, but with sales of imports
into the home state.  To the extent that the firm sells to a
national market, such a tax would tend to raise the price
of the goods sold in the home state.
17The single business tax (SBT) is levied on a tax base of
value added for firms in the state, calculated by adding
factor payments including interest paid, business income,
depreciation, and labor compensation.  The tax base
deviates from value added by origin in that multistate
firms are allowed to apportion business activity according
to a formula that gives 50 percent weight of the taxable
base to the firm’s Michigan share of sales to total sales
nationwide, and 25 percent weight each to the Michigan
location of firm property and payroll.  Other reductions or
credits involve small firms, low-profit small firms, and all
firms characterized by labor compensation bills which
exceed 63 percent of the tax base.  See Citizen’s Research
Council of Michigan (1995).  The state previously im-
posed another form of the tax, the business activities tax,
from 1953 to 1967.
18Value-added taxes are used by many countries, and a
lively debate is now under way in the U.S. over whether
to impose the tax at the national level.  Such a tax would
likely differ in intent and structure from that envisioned
herein for state governments.  A national tax in the U.S. is
often envisioned as a “consumption-type” value-added
tax, a national sales tax which would be imposed on
consumption and might be designed to replace some
existing revenue sources to encourage national savings
behavior.  In contrast, the tax base for state value-added
taxation could include capital consumption, thereby
relating more closely to business benefits received as
reflected in total business activity in a state.
In many other countries, value-added taxes were enacted
to eliminate significant imbalances in “turnover” type
taxes, which tended to tax the gross receipts of firms at
each stage of production.
19These value-added data by industry sector are derived by
both the addition method and the substraction method.
See U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic
Analysis (1985).  Gross state product is equivalent in
concept to national gross domestic product (which includ-
ed capital consumption and indirect taxes in its defini-
tion).
20Such studies often follow the “rate-of-return” approach
developed by James Papke.  For example, see Tannen-
wald (1993).
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